Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
1
The Impact of Monetary Policy on Unemployment
Hysteresis

Introduction
Can Central Banks affect structural unemployment? The ECB's answer is a resounding no. "Real income or the level of employment in the economy are, in the long run, essentially determined by real (supply-side) factors ([…] welfare policies and other regulations determining the flexibility of markets […] )" (ECB, 2004, p. 41) . On the other hand, Olivier
Blanchard, Chief Economist of the IMF, argues that "monetary policy affects both the actual and the natural rate of unemployment" (Blanchard, 2003, p. 4) . A look at the development of unemployment over time suggests that unemployment is growing in steps. As can be seen in Figure 1 , unemployment is growing dramatically during recessions. While unemployment returns to pre-recession levels in some countries, it does not in others. These countries also experience an increase in the NAIRU. The hypothesis to be explored is that monetary policy explains an important part of these different patterns.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Monetary policy affects economic activity through several channels including interest rates, bank credits, asset prices, exchange rates and expectations (Mishkin, 1996; ECB, 2004) . Romer and Romer (1994) have argued that monetary policy has been the key variable to end recessions. There is also substantial evidence that monetary policy is most effective during recessions (Lo/Piger, 2005) . Peersman and Smets (2001) find for large European countries that the effect of an interest rate shock on output almost doubles during a recession. This suggests that monetary policy reactions may be important in understanding the behaviour of unemployment over time.
In a well known paper, Laurence Ball (1999) found that differences in monetary policy during recessions of the early 1980s explain a substantial part of how much of the cyclical increase in unemployment has become structural. His study was based on an in-depth analysis of selected 2 countries and on econometric analysis which covered the recessions of 17 OECD countries in the early 1980s. This paper takes Ball's approach as a starting point and updates and extends it. A pooled cross-country analysis with quarterly data is used to investigate the impact of a reduction in short-term real interest rates during a recession on the NAIRU five years later (relative to the maximum increase in unemployment during the recession). This paper extends Ball's (1999) analysis along four dimensions. First the sample is significantly extended by investigating the recessions of OECD countries between 1980 and 2003. Second, quarterly rather than annual data is used to measure the period of recessions and the reaction of monetary policy. Third, a richer set of labour market institutions is controlled for. Fourth, several tests of robustness are performed by varying the definition of key variables.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses briefly the theory behind the structural rate of unemployment, the NAIRU. Section 3 surveys the relevant empirical literature explaining unemployment and the NAIRU. Section 4 continues with methodology and data issues. In Section 5 the results of the econometric analysis are presented. Section 6 addresses several tests of robustness, and Section 7 concludes.
The NAIRU theory and unemployment hysteresis
The NAIRU is defined as the rate of unemployment at which inflation is stable. Sometimes it is referred to as long-run or structural unemployment. If unemployment drops below the NAIRU, workers can achieve a higher rate of growth of money wages in wage bargaining, which in turn leads firms to increase the growth rate of prices. Rising inflation will again cause rising nominal wage claims and trigger a wage-price spiral (e.g. Layard et al., 1991; Carlin and Soskice, 2006 ).
The NAIRU model is a rather general macroeconomic framework, for which different interpretations exist. In particular there is a debate on the determinants of the NAIRU itself and on the disequilibrium dynamics (Stockhammer, 2008) . According to the New Consensus Model, Central Banks (assuming they follow a Taylor Rule or are inflation-targeting) will react to the wage-price spiral by raising real interest rates. It is generally assumed that the Central Bank is able to increase (short-term) real interest rates via the variation of (short-term) 3 nominal interest rates. The increased interest rates will affect real output negatively and increase unemployment. Rising unemployment deteriorates the bargaining position of workers and makes income claims of workers and employers compatible. This mechanism is assumed to work symmetrically so that Central Banks are able to stimulate growth by lowering interest rates.
The level of the NAIRU is determined ceteris paribus by the degree of competition on goods markets, which influences the profit claims, and labour market institutions, such as the generosity and duration of unemployment benefits, the tax wedge, or employment protection legislation, which influence the wage claims. According to what one might call the exogeneity view these are the only determinants of the NAIRU. This interpretation is expressed in the opening quotation from the ECB and is also associated with the OECD which has used it in its early recommendations to argue that inflexible labour markets are the reason for persistently high unemployment in Europe (OECD, 1994) .
Alternative interpretations emphasize the endogeneity of the NAIRU. Endogeneity is either rooted in economic variables which simultaneously affect actual unemployment and the NAIRU or in hysteresis which means that actual unemployment influences the NAIRU. In the latter case the unemployment rate serves as an attractor for the NAIRU and demand policy which influences unemployment will also (indirectly) affect the NAIRU.
Several explanations for hysteresis have been put forward. First, in the insider-outsider model it is assumed that the labour force is divided between these two groups, the insiders and outsiders: employed vs. unemployed, highly qualified vs. less qualified, trade union members vs. non-trade union members, etc. While the insiders have a strong position in wage bargaining, e.g. because of their firm specific know-how, the outsider group is not a perfect competitor for the insider-position and has therefore little or no influence on the wage bargaining process. In this case a higher unemployment rate may not have any impact on wages (Blanchard and Summers, 1986) . Second, deskilling of the long-term unemployed may make them imperfect substitutes for employed workers:
"The higher is the proportion of long-term unemployment in the overall pool of unemployment, the less impact will any given level of unemployment have on wage setting. If this is the case, then since a long period of high unemployment is likely to eventually push up the proportion of the long-term unemployed, equilibrium unemployment will rise." (Carlin and Soskice, 2006, p. 119) 4 Third, fairness considerations can give rise to endogenous wage aspirations (Skott, 2005 There are also some macroeconomic variables that may affect the NAIRU itself. Among these, two prominent factors are capital accumulation and the interest rate. Capital scrapping during long-lasting recessions will lead to a decline in the capital stock (in parallel with rising unemployment). If there is limited (ex-post) substitutability between capital and labour, a positive demand shock will have inflationary effects at lower levels of employment -the NAIRU has risen (Rowthorn, 1995 (Rowthorn, , 1999 Bean, 1989) . Increases in the interest rate may affect the NAIRU directly because it may increase firms' target mark up (Hein, 2006) and it will have a negative effect on capital accumulation.
Keynesian economists thus interpret the NAIRU not as the long-run equilibrium rate of unemployment, but as a short-term inflation barrier, which shifts with economic activity and depends on the real rate of interest (Arestis and Sawyer, 2005; Hein, 2004 Hein, , 2006 Lavoie, 2006; Stockhammer, 2008) .
A survey of the empirical literature
The view that differences in unemployment across countries and over time can be explained by changes in labour market institutions has been forcefully put forward by the OECD Jobs Study (OECD, 1994) and since shaped policy making. While this view is at times almost treated as an economic fact, the available evidence is surprisingly mixed. IMF (2003) and Nickell et al. (2005) report strong effects of labour market institutions on unemployment.
3 Others (to be discussed presently) are much more sceptical. What is at stake is not whether labour market institutions influence the NAIRU -this view is generally shared -but whether 1 The near-rationality approach of Akerlof et al. (2000) and Akerlof (2007) leads to similar policy conclusions regarding the influence of monetary policy on the long-run Phillips curve. 2 Additional explanations for hysteresis are summarized in Røed (1997) . 3 For a critical discussion of OECD (1994) see OECD (2006) , especially chapter 6, and Blanchard and Katz (1997) . For a critical discussion of IMF (2003) see Baker et al. (2004) , Freeman (2005) and Baccaro and Rei (2007 (Mitchell, 1993; Røed, 1996; León-Ledesma, 2002 When structural changes in the stationarity tests are allowed for, the null hypothesis of a unit root in unemployment is often rejected (Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal, 1999; Papell et al., 2000; Camarero et al., 2006) . However, these results also suggest that structural breaks are crucial to describe the development of unemployment over time and "that shocks have highly persistent […] effects on unemployment" (Camarero et al., 2006, p. 180) . Using a similar approach León-Ledesma and McAdam (2004) argue that it is difficult to distinguish transition effects and hysteresis in empirical research.
6 Jaeger and Parkinson (1994) apply an unobserved components analysis using a Kalman-filter to decompose unemployment into a structural component and a cyclical component and find evidence for hysteresis in Canada, Germany and the UK, but not for the USA. The impact of lagged cyclical unemployment on the NAIRU is interpreted as hysteresis. A similar approach is followed by Logeay and Tober (2005) who find a strong impact of hysteresis in explaining the rise of the NAIRU in the Euro-zone.
One important stream of the literature links unemployment to capital accumulation. Rowthorn and find that besides some labour market institutions, the long-run real interest rate has a statistically significant impact on unemployment.
With respect to the influence of monetary policy on output there is substantial evidence that monetary policy has asymmetric effects. 4 Peersman and Smets (2001) (Garcia/Schaller, 2002; Lo/Piger, 2005) , Germany (Kakes, 2000; Kuzin/Tober, 2004) and Spain (Dolado/Maria-Dolores, 2001 ).
Combining these results with the literature highlighting the role of shocks in explaining unemployment, Laurence Ball (1999) focuses on the role of monetary policy in recessions when explaining structural unemployment. First Ball analyzes the effect of monetary policy in the recessions of the early 1980s by using descriptive statistics based on quarterly data for the G7 countries and by means of regression analysis for 17 OECD countries (using annual data).
Second, to account for differences in the decrease in unemployment rates he discusses monetary policy and labour market policies in four successful countries and six countries with disappointing performance. Ball concludes that "[m]onetary policy and other determinants of aggregate demand have long-run effects on unemployment. Throughout the OECD, the reactions of policy to recessions in the early 1980s helped determine whether unemployment rose temporarily or permanently." (Ball, 1999, p. 234) The sample of his econometric analysis is rather small as it includes only the 17 recessions of the early 1980s. There has been surprisingly little effort to check whether Ball's results can be generalized, i.e. to apply his approach to other periods. This is where this paper comes in. 
Methodology and data
The hypothesis to be tested is that restrictive behaviour of monetary policy during the recession will trigger a hysteresis effect: the cyclical increase in unemployment will become permanent and result in an increase in structural unemployment in the period after the recession. The increase in the NAIRU in different countries and time periods will be affected by the severity of recessions. Thus the dependent variable will be the increase in the NAIRU relative to the increase in unemployment, rather than the increase in the NAIRU itself. In the econometric analysis this degree of hysteresis will be explained by the extent of monetary easing, labour market institutions and other control variables.
Where H, ME, L, C, and T are the degree of hysteresis, monetary easing, a vector of labour market institutions, a vector of other control variables and a vector of time dummies, respectively.
A recession is defined here as two or more consecutive quarters of decline in real GDP and an increase in unemployment. 5 The first part of this definition follows convention. The additional requirement that unemployment has to increase is necessary for our dependent variable to have a meaningful interpretation. Only in one case (Italy 2001) is there a GDP recession without an increase in unemployment. As some recessions are followed by a short recovery 9 period, and then return to negative rates of output growth, we treat two recessions within an eight quarter period as the same recession.
The dependent variable is the degree of hysteresis (H).
It is defined as the increase in the NAIRU ( N u Δ ) in the 5 years after the peak of the business cycle relative to the maximum
). More technically, the numerator is the change in the OECD's (ex post) NAWRU from the (mean of four quarters prior to the) beginning of the recession to (the mean of four quarters) five years later. 6 If within these five years (but not in the first two years) another recession begins, the period is shortened so that those recessions (and their following periods) are not overlapping.
The denominator of the degree of hysteresis is the greatest increase in actual unemployment from the quarter before the recession to at most 18 quarters later (for all countries in the sample quarterly data is available).
The degree of hysteresis measures the degree of the rise in actual unemployment during a recession which has become structural. If this variable is zero, this means that the NAIRU remained unchanged, and the recession did not lead to a rise in structural unemployment. If its value is one, this means that an increase in unemployment directly translates into an increase in the NAIRU.
Monetary easing is the cumulated change of the ex post short-term real interest rate per quarter between the first quarter of the recession and the second quarter after the recession. In these last two quarters growth rates are positive again, but absolute values of output are still below trend in most cases. 7 Monetary policy is expected to show an especially strong impact in this vulnerable period. The real interest rate is constructed (as in Ball 1999) as the nominal short-term interest rate (i t ) minus the average consumer price inflation in the periods t (-4) to t (-1) and t (-3) to t.
The real interest rate has an impact on various economic variables, but it is not strictly a policy-controlled variable. The analysis presupposes that (during a recession) changes in the real interest rate are driven by changes in nominal rates rather than inflation. Moreover, our sample includes countries that are part of the Euro area and have lost the ability to autonomously set interest rates. Rather, they will be affected by different real interest rates wage pressure and, eventually, the degree of hysteresis (see e.g. Layard et al., 1991; Bassanini and Duval, 2006 Specification 1 includes all labour market institutions and no time dummies. Specification 2 includes time dummies t1, t2 and t3, which take on the value one if the recessions began in the period 1980-1986, 1987-95 and 1996-2003 respectively. These dummy variables should capture changes in the international environment or changes common to all countries that are not adequately captured by the control variables. It turns out that the values for t1 and t2 are virtually identical and differ substantially from t3. Therefore specification 3 includes an intercept and only t3. This specification then forms the basis for further variations of the specifications. ME is statistically significant at the 1% level in all reported specifications.
Among the labour market institutions PMR and d_TOT are statistically significant and show 10 In the case of Ireland the OECD-data was complemented with data form the IMF International Financial Statistics for the quarterly short-term interest rate until 1983q4. 11 The quarterly GDP data for Greece are unreliable according to the OECD Help Desk and no labour market institutions data are available. No quarterly GDP data is available for Austria. No data on labour market institutions is available for Luxembourg and Iceland. No quarterly data are available for Germany prior to 1991, as a consequence the German recession 1991/92 had to be excluded. 12 Two observations had to be excluded. The degree of hysteresis is designed such that the variable lies between 0 and 1. Indeed this is the case for most countries. However there are some exceptions. The Finnish recession in 2001 shows a degree of hysteresis of -17.2. This is because the NAIRU was decreasing by 1.3 percent points, while the unemployment rate rose slightly by 0.07 percent points. Also, the Norwegian recession of 1980 is a statistical outlier as the monetary easing indicator lies more than three and a half standard deviations under the mean. The Finnish case results from definitions used and thus illustrates the limitations of this approach. 13 As the critical value for not rejecting the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity we choose a probability value of 0.15.
12 the expected sign in specification 1. But in specification 2 and 3 both are insignificant and PMR even changes its sign. The adjusted R-squared varies between 29 and 41%.
Insert Table 1 about here The variables for labour market institutions could be correlated among each other as they may measure different aspects of a given welfare regime. The lack of statistically significant effects may thus be due to multicollinearity problems. PMR and UD, and TW and EPL are the only two variable pairs that show correlation coefficient of above 0.5 (see Table A .2).
Specification 4 thus drops PMR and TW to check whether the low level of statistical significance was due to multicollinearity. This is not the case. In specification 4 only d_TOT Taking the preferred estimate of ME, a one standard deviation change in monetary easing (0.39) reduces the degree of hysteresis by 0.27. This is roughly half of the standard deviation of the dependent variable.
Robustness
To check the robustness of these results, several tests were performed. First, different variations of the definition of the monetary easing period were tried. This period was initially defined as starting in the first quarter of a recession and ending two quarters after the recession. In variation 1 the monetary easing period was redefined so that it starts in the first 13 quarter of a recession, but ends one quarter after the recession (like in Romer and Romer, 1994) . In this variation only ME is statistically significant in explaining the degree of hysteresis (see Table 2 ). Specification 15 includes all control variables, while specification 16 is without PMR and TW. The coefficient varies between 0.34 and 0.38, which is somewhat lower than in the baseline version.
Insert Table 2 about here Second, this monetary easing period was redefined so that it starts one quarter before the recession (and ends two quarters after the recession). It could be argued that this quarter before the actual beginning of the recession is also of importance for anticyclical stabilization policy as interest rate shocks take time to become effective. Results with this alternative definition of the monetary easing period are reported in Table 2 (specification 17 and 18). In both specifications ME and d_TOT are statistically significant and show the expected sign.
Again, the other control variables do not show a significant impact. The coefficient of ME ranges between 0.78 and 0.85, which is slightly higher than in the baseline version.
Variation 3 measures inflation by the GDP-deflator (OECD data) instead of the consumer price index. In specification 19 in Table 2 , including all control variables, no explanatory variable is statistically significant. After excluding PMR and TW (specification 20) the ME becomes statistically significant at the 10% level. If control variables are included individually ME is statistically significant in eight of this ten specifications (four times at the 5% level and four times at the 10% level). Also TW is statistically significant (see Table A . 3).
The coefficient of ME varies between 0.29 and 0.42, which is slightly lower than in the baseline version.
Fourth, the definition of the real interest rates is altered to allow for forward-looking inflation expectations. In the baseline version real interest rates are defined as the nominal interest rates minus the average consumer price inflation in the periods t (-4) to t (-1) and t (-3) to t. This definition assumes adaptive expectations. But literature on monetary policy often stresses that economic agents are forward-looking (e.g. Clarida et al. 1999) . As a simple way to a more forward-looking definition of inflation expectations, we assume that expected inflation is a weighted average of past and (actual) future inflation. The average consumer price inflation in the period t (-2) to t (+2) is used. The results of this fourth variation again show a statistically significant impact of ME, at the 10% level also of d_TOT, and in one specification of EPL (see Table 2 , Specification 21 and 22). 14 The coefficient of ME varies between 0.41 and 0.46, which lies somewhere between the baseline version and variation 1.
In variation 5 the changes in labour market institutions (from the year when the recession started to five years later) rather than their levels are included. The coefficients estimates for monetary easing as well as their statistical significance are again robust against this variation (see Table 2 , specification 23). The coefficient of ME lies at 0.66. EPL and UD show a statistically significant impact, but with a perverse sign.
Overall the results seem reasonably robust against variations in the definitions. In general, ME shows a significant impact in the different variations and specifications. But hardly any control variable besides the change in terms of trade shows a statistically significant impact on the degree of hysteresis.
As noted earlier, real interest rates can be an inaccurate measure for monetary policy because real interest rates may be driven by inflation differences rather than by differences in policy- Note: *, **, and *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. ME = indicator for monetary easing; ALMP = spending on active labour market policy per unemployed to GDP per capita; EPL = employment protection legislation; HIGHCORP = dummy for countries with high corporatism in the wage-bargaining system; LOWCORP = dummy for countries with low corporatism in the wage-bargaining system; PMR = product market regulation; TW = tax wedge; UBD = unemployment benefit duration; UBR = average unemployment benefit replacement rate; UD = union density; d_TOT = change in relative prices of imports weighted by the share of imports in GDP; adj R2 = adjusted R-squared; n = number of observations; HC SE = estimated with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Estimated with E-Views 5.1 Note: *, **, and *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. ME = indicator for monetary easing; ALMP = spending on active labour market policy per unemployed to GDP per capita; EPL = employment protection legislation; HIGHCORP = dummy for countries with high corporatism in the wage-bargaining system; LOWCORP = dummy for countries with low corporatism in the wage-bargaining system; PMR = product market regulation; TW = tax wedge; UBD = unemployment benefit duration; UBR = average unemployment benefit replacement rate; UD = union density; d_TOT = change in relative prices of imports weighted by the share of imports in GDP; adj R2 = adjusted R-squared; n = number of observations; HC SE = estimated with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Estimated with E-Views 5.1 1990q4 -0,24 -0,40 6,36 0,20 2,29 24,80 0,48 11,10 15,47 ALMP = spending on active labour market policy per unemployed to GDP per capita; EPL = employment protection legislation; HIGHCORP = dummy for countries with high corporatism in the wage-bargaining system; LOWCORP = dummy for countries with low corporatism in the wage-bargaining system; PMR = product market regulation; TW = tax wedge; UBD = unemployment benefit duration; UBR = average unemployment benefit replacement rate; UD = union density; d_TOT = change in relative prices of imports weighted by the share of imports in GDP. Estimated with E-Views 5.1 Note: *, **, and *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. ME = indicator for monetary easing; ALMP = spending on active labour market policy per unemployed to GDP per capita; EPL = employment protection legislation; HIGHCORP = dummy for countries with high corporatism in the wage-bargaining system; LOWCORP = dummy for countries with low corporatism in the wage-bargaining system; PMR = product market regulation; TW = tax wedge; UBD = unemployment benefit duration; UBR = average unemployment benefit replacement rate; UD = union density; d_TOT = change in relative prices of imports weighted by the share of imports in GDP; adj R2 = adjusted R-squared; n = number of observations; HC SE = estimated with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Estimated with E-Views 5.1
